E·J EDGARD JACQUES ASIA-PACIFIC

MACROECONOMIC REVIEW

Vietnam

Q3 2026, to date

A research-led view of policy, macro momentum, housing data limits, public finance and banking context.

Reference date

23 August 2026. Q3 is in progress; full-quarter releases were not available. All policy measures are identified as **proposed** or **enacted** as applicable.

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1 Executive view

Vietnam enters third-quarter 2026 information available to 23 August (Q3 2026, to date) with an unusually strong first-half growth profile, increasingly visible industrial momentum and robust investment inflows. The National Statistics Office (NSO) reported GDP growth of **8.39% year on year in Q2 2026** and **8.18% in H1 2026**. Manufacturing value added expanded 10.23% in H1; July industrial production then rose 14.5% year on year. This supports a constructive near-term activity narrative, while the policy and financing environment remains important to watch. [1]

EJ perspective

The opportunity is not simply a growth headline. The useful question for shareholders and management teams is whether demand, execution capacity, balance-sheet discipline and governance are moving together. Vietnam's current momentum is favourable, but the quality of growth will remain shaped by trade balances, credit allocation, property stress points and policy execution.

1.1 What matters now

Theme	Latest verified reading	Why it matters
Growth	8.18% H1 GDP growth; 8.39% Q2 year on year	Strong activity offers a supportive backdrop, but H1 data should not be presented as a full-Q3 outcome.
Prices	July CPI: −0.12% month on month; +4.45% year on year	Inflation requires monitoring as domestic demand and administered-price effects evolve.
Trade	H1 exports: USD 266.52bn; imports: USD 283.17bn; goods deficit: USD 16.65bn	Strong import growth may be consistent with production expansion but also deepens external-financing and demand questions.
Investment	Registered FDI: USD 34.65bn; disbursed FDI: USD 13.03bn at 30 June	FDI remains a key channel for manufacturing capacity, supply-chain deepening and technology transfer.
Credit	7.41% growth by 26 June	Credit is a material transmission channel to SMEs, property and banks; speed and composition are more informative than the headline alone.

Source: NSO Q2 / H1 2026 report and July archive. All values in this table are H1 or July data, not full-Q3 results. [1]

1.2 Near-term watch list

Policy conversion	Whether the proposed SME-focused tax measure passes and, if passed, how eligibility and administrative implementation are defined.

External balance	Whether import growth remains investment-led and productive, or begins to outpace export capacity and domestic value capture.
Credit composition	The distribution of loan growth across productive investment, working capital, consumer credit and property-linked activity.
Inflation / FX	The interaction between domestic prices, the VND and imported input costs as activity accelerates.
Bank capital and allocation	The balance between retained profits, share dividends, cash dividends and lending capacity at state-controlled banks.

2 Policy and the Q3-to-date macro picture

2.1 A targeted tax proposal — not enacted law

On 21 August 2026, Vietnam's Government presented a proposal for a 30% reduction in personal income tax payable on qualifying business income and corporate income tax payable for eligible domestic enterprises and organisations with annual revenue of no more than VND 10 billion, for 2026 and 2027. The reported Ministry of Finance estimate is a fiscal cost of VND 3.191 trillion in 2026 and VND 3.510 trillion in 2027. [2] The report treats this measure as a **proposal**, not an enacted entitlement. For operating businesses, the eventual legislation, eligibility mechanics, tax-base treatment and compliance burden matter more than the headline percentage alone. For shareholders, the proposal signals an intent to support smaller formal businesses, but it should not be booked into earnings forecasts before the law and guidance are confirmed.

2.2 Activity is strong, but the time label matters

The activity data available at the reference date cover H1 and July, rather than a completed third quarter. This distinction protects against a common reporting error: combining H1 GDP with July indicators and presenting them as Q3 data. The right framing is Q3 2026, to date.



图 1 Vietnam's population expanded from 92.8 million in 2015 to 101.0 million in 2024, while annual growth slowed from 1.24% to 0.63%.

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) population total and annual population growth. Population is a structural input rather than a near-term demand forecast. [3]

3 Demography, housing and living standards

3.1 A demographic tailwind with a slower pace of expansion

Vietnam's population increased by 8.2 million people between 2015 and 2024. The annual growth rate eased across the period, reaching 0.63% in 2024. That combination matters for strategic planning: the absolute consumer and workforce base continues to grow, while the medium-term composition of demand, productivity and household formation becomes more important than population growth alone. [3]

3.2 Housing: what the data do, and do not, show

The user-requested homelessness and home-ownership measures cannot honestly be plotted as ten annual observations. No nationally comparable official annual homelessness series was identified. The 2019 Population and Housing Census is the defensible national benchmark: it recorded 4,418 people without a house to live in, 6.9% of households in temporary or simple houses and 11.7% in rented or borrowed homes. The 88.3% figure below is a calculated self-occupancy / owner proxy (100% minus rented or borrowed), not a complete legal-title ownership measure. [4]



图 2 Official 2019 housing benchmark. This is intentionally not displayed as a fabricated ten-year annual series.

Interpretation

Housing quality, tenure and homelessness are distinct measures. Temporary/simple dwellings and crowding are best understood as housing-adequacy indicators; they should not be relabelled as homelessness.

3.3 Poverty and public debt



图 3 The national poverty-headcount series falls through 2022, while IMF general-government gross debt declines materially after 2016.

The national poverty-headcount series declines from 9.2% in 2016 to 4.2% in 2022. The latest observation in the selected WDI series is 2022; the report does not extrapolate it. General-government gross debt falls to 31.2% of GDP in 2024 in the IMF series. Vietnam's GDP rebasing in 2019 is an important comparability note for interpreting the ratio over time. [3] [5]

4 Banking: profitability, state ownership and capital allocation

4.1 Why the chart is a sample, not a system total

There was no sufficiently consistent, publicly verifiable ten-year total profit series for the entire Vietnamese banking system at the required standard of evidence. The report therefore uses a transparent sample of three listed state-controlled banks: Vietcombank, BIDV and VietinBank. Agribank and all other banks are excluded. The series is useful for directional context, but it must not be called total Vietnamese banking-system profit.



图 4 Statutory post-tax profit sample: Vietcombank, BIDV and VietinBank only, 2015–2024.

The aggregate sample increases from VND 17.3 trillion in 2015 to VND 84.9 trillion in 2024. The labels are closely related but not identical VAS-based post-tax metrics — consolidated PAT for some banks and net profit attributable for others — so the series is presented as a reported-profit comparison, not a reconstructed common accounting model. [6] [7] [8]

4.2 State ownership is material to profit destination



图 5 Latest state ownership disclosed for the selected major state-controlled banks.

For state-controlled banks, the pathway from profit to public benefit should not be reduced to a single dividend number. In principle, profit first bears corporate income tax; post-tax earnings can then be allocated to statutory reserves, investment/development and welfare/reward funds, retained earnings and dividends. The state’s economic interest can reach the State Budget through tax and cash dividends, while share dividends or retained earnings can recapitalise banks and support lending capacity. Annual AGM resolutions and the current financial-regime rules determine the detailed allocation. [9]

Governance lens

High state ownership increases the strategic relevance of capital retention, dividend policy, provisioning and credit allocation. The key investor question is not simply “where did the profit go?”, but how much was taxed, reserved, retained, distributed and reinvested.

5 Australia comparison: profits, per-resident context and ownership disclosure

5.1 Australia's Big Four — a transparent statutory basis

The Australian series uses each bank's reported statutory net profit after tax (NPAT) / profit attributable to owners: CBA, Westpac, ANZ and NAB. CBA reports to 30 June, while the other three report to 30 September. The aggregate is therefore an indicative same-year comparison rather than a common-period consolidated result. KPMG's independently compiled FY2025 benchmark of AUD 29.8 billion is a cross-check only; the ten-year chart is built from the banks' own reports. [10]



图 6 Australian Big Four statutory profits and the aggregate divided by annual Australian population, fiscal years 2015–2024.

The aggregate statutory profit series reaches AUD 29.9 billion in 2024, equivalent to AUD 1,099 per resident when divided by the World Bank's 2024 Australian population estimate. This is a contextual ratio only. It does not represent a fee, tax or amount paid by each resident. [3] [11] [12] [13] [14]

5.2 Asset managers are not private-equity funds

The relevant institutional disclosures do not support a claim that US private-equity funds own "about 30%" of each bank. BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street are global **asset managers**, not private-equity funds. The chart below shows separate reported regulatory relevant interest / voting power (relevant interest) / voting-power disclosures. These should not be summed into a single "US ownership" percentage and should not be equated with ultimate beneficial ownership. Nominee and custodian registers identify legal holders, not necessarily the underlying investors. [15]



图 7 Latest identified asset-manager relevant-interest disclosures; filing dates differ by bank and manager.

6 Implications for shareholders and growth partners

6.1 What the current picture suggests

Area	EJ analytical implication
SME policy	If the proposed tax relief becomes law, qualifying revenue thresholds and compliance treatment may matter more than the headline 30% cut. Businesses should protect documentation and scenario-plan; they should not assume eligibility prematurely.
Industrial / FDI momentum	Fast growth and FDI inflows support capacity expansion, but shareholder value will depend on local execution, supply-chain position, working capital and management depth.
Housing and household data	Do not use the 2019 census benchmark to construct false annual social indicators. For location strategy or impact claims, seek local survey or project-level evidence.
Banking	The listed state-controlled sample shows strong profit growth, while ownership and dividend choices make retained capital and policy objectives central variables.
Australia comparison	The per-resident calculation adds scale context but is not a burden-on-households measure. Fiscal-year timing and statutory-versus-cash-earnings distinctions should remain explicit.
Ownership	Use substantial-holder notices as disclosure context. Do not equate a nominee account, asset manager or filing threshold with a beneficial-control conclusion.

6.2 Risk watch list

- **Policy risk:** The proposed tax measure may change in legislative process or contain eligibility conditions that alter its practical value.
- **Data risk:** Housing/homelessness and national poverty observations have different coverage and periodicity. The report keeps those limitations visible rather than smoothing them away.
- **Macro risk:** Continued strong imports, credit expansion, CPI and FX developments should be monitored alongside activity growth.
- **Banking risk:** Profit growth is not the same as distributable cash; capital adequacy, provisioning, reserve allocations and state-policy priorities affect profit use.
- **Comparability risk:** Vietnam's VAS-based bank metrics differ from Australian statutory reporting, and the Australian banks do not share a single year end.

7 Basis, limitations and methodology

7.1 Basis

Vietnam population and poverty use World Bank WDI annual observations. Public debt uses the IMF's general-government gross debt-to-GDP measure. Vietnam banking is a three-bank listed, state-controlled sample (Vietcombank, BIDV and VietinBank), not a total banking-system series. **Australian profits are statutory reported NPAT / attributable profit, summed by reported fiscal year. Aggregate profit per resident equals aggregate AUD profit × 1,000,000 ÷ annual Australian population.** Australian ownership is a point-in-time collection of disclosed regulatory relevant-interest / voting-power information, not a beneficial-ownership census.

7.2 Time and assumptions

The reference date is **23 August 2026**. The report is labelled **Q3 2026, to date** because H1 and July official data were available, not full-quarter results. Ten-year charts use 2015–2024 to preserve a complete annual basis across the comparative series. Values are presented at source precision in the underlying data pack and rounded only for display in the report.

7.3 Data limitations

Vietnam has no nationally comparable annual official homelessness series identified for this report. The 2019 census benchmark is presented once, not extrapolated. No directly comparable official annual home-ownership series was located. The report uses a stated self-occupancy proxy from the 2019 census tenure observation. **Poverty data stop in 2022 in the selected WDI series; no forward values are estimated.** Vietnam's 2019 GDP rebasing is flagged for debt-ratio comparability. **No verified full-system Vietnamese bank-profit series was used; the sample's coverage is explicitly stated beside the chart.** Asset-manager disclosures can remain unchanged until reporting thresholds are triggered and do not reveal all ultimate beneficial holders.

7.4 Glossary

***FDI* – foreign direct investment**: Investment recorded by the National Statistics Office as registered or disbursed inward foreign direct investment.

***IMF* – International Monetary Fund**: Source of the general-government gross debt-to-GDP series used here.

***NPAT* – net profit after tax**: Australian bank statutory net profit after tax or net profit attributable to owners, as reported in annual results.

***PAT* – profit after tax**: Statutory post-tax profit reported by a bank. In this report, the source label differs modestly by bank under Vietnamese Accounting Standards.

***Q3 2026, to date* – third-quarter 2026 information available to 23 August**: A time-reference label: full-quarter national accounts and other quarter-end outcomes were not available at the report reference date.

***relevant interest* – regulatory relevant interest / voting power**: A disclosure concept used in Australian substantial-holder filings. It is not the same as ultimate beneficial ownership.

***SBV* – State Bank of Vietnam**: Vietnam's central bank and state-shareholding representative for the major state-controlled commercial banks discussed in this review.

***WDI* – World Development Indicators**: The World Bank’s public macroeconomic indicator database.

8 Source register

[1] National Statistics Office of Vietnam, **Report socio-economic performance in second quarter and the first half of 2026**; NSO data archive, July 2026. nso.gov.vn

[2] Government News, **Gov't proposes 30% reduction in personal and corporate income tax to spur economic growth**, 21 August 2026. baochinhphu.vn

[3] World Bank, World Development Indicators: Vietnam and Australia population, population growth and national poverty headcount. World Bank API

[4] UN Viet Nam / National Statistics Office, **Results of the Population and Housing Census 01/4/2019**. vietnam.un.org

[5] International Monetary Fund, DataMapper, Vietnam general-government gross debt (GGXWDG_NGDP). imf.org

[6] Vietcombank, investor relations / audited financial statements and annual-report financial highlights. vietcombank.com.vn

[7] BIDV, audited consolidated financial statements and investor presentations. bidv.com.vn

[8] VietinBank, financial statements / investor relations. investor.vietinbank.vn

[9] State-controlled bank AGM documentation, investor relations disclosures and Vietnam financial-regime regulations (including Decree 135/2025/ND-CP as cited in the report research log). Latest ownership values: VCB 74.80%; BIDV 80.99%; CTG 64.46%; Agribank 100%.

[10] KPMG Australia, **Big four major banks full-year results 2025**. kpmg.com

[11] Commonwealth Bank, annual reports and results archive. commbank.com.au

[12] Westpac, annual reports. westpac.com.au

[13] ANZ, annual reports and ASX announcements. anz.com

[14] NAB, annual reports. nab.com.au

[15] Australian Big Four annual reports and ASX substantial-holder disclosure registers. Filing dates and disclosed percentages used for the ownership chart are preserved in the report data pack and chart source notes.

Research disclosure

Basis: reported public-statistics and statutory-reporting metrics described above. Time: 23 August 2026, with Q3 2026 in progress. Assumptions: ten-year charts use 2015–2024; no missing national social series is estimated. Sources and confidence: primary official statistics, bank disclosures and public regulatory records are prioritised; limitations are stated beside each series. **This is research and analysis only, not personalized financial advice.**